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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
NICHOLAS GARCIA RAMIREZ,

Case No. 920148-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court commit reversible error in concluding
that the eyewitness identification of Mr. Ramirez was admissible?
Although the trial judge's underlying
factual findings are subject to a clearly
erroneous standard of review, his conclusion as
to "whether these facts are sufficient to
demonstrate reliability is a question of law,"
which this Court reviews for correctness.
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991);
see also State v. Adams. 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 72,
73 (Utah App. 1992).

TEXT OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States constitution provides:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside• No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In an Information dated December 21, 1990, the State
charged Defendant/Appellant Nicholas Garcia Ramirez with one count
of Attempted Homicide and one count of Aggravated Robbery.
R. 6-7.

On April 9, 1991, the State amended the Information to

charge Mr. Ramirez with one count of Aggravated Assault and one
count of Aggravated Robbery.

R. 8-9.

On June 11, 1991, Mr. Ramirez filed a motion to suppress
the eyewitness identification and a memorandum in support of that
motion.

R. 53-7. See Addendum A for copy of motion and memorandum.
Following an evidentiary hearing and argument held on

June 26 and 27, 1991, the trial judge denied the motion.

See

Addendum B for a copy of the transcript of the trial court's oral
ruling.
On February 14, 1992, pursuant to Rule 11(8), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Mr. Ramirez entered a plea of no contest to
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, with the recommendation
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by the State that he be sentenced as a class A misdemeanor, given
credit for time served, and released that day.

R. 121-2.

As part

of that no contest plea, Mr. Ramirez reserved his right to appeal
the adverse ruling on his motion to suppress identification.

R. 99,

121.
The trial court followed the State's recommendation and
sentenced Mr. Ramirez to a class A misdemeanor at the time of the
change of plea.

The trial court gave Mr. Ramirez credit for

fourteen months time served and released him from custody.

R. 126,

107; see Judgment contained in Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 1, 1990, Leslie Norwood was stabbed in an alley
behind the Broadway Deli located at 200 West 300 South in Salt Lake
City.

R. 199. Mr. Norwood immediately approached a woman for help;

she called an ambulance.

R. 206. Shortly after, Mr. Norwood

arrived at LDS Hospital; his blood alcohol level was .364. R. 173.
The emergency room doctor who treated Mr. Norwood testified that
Mr. Norwood smelled of alcohol and was in a stupor.

R. 172-3.

Although Mr. Norwood was responsive to pain, he was not responsive
to verbal commands.

R. 174.

When the incident occurred, Mr. Norwood was walking through
the Broadway Deli parking lot, in search of cigarettes and either
food or liquor.

R. 160, 204. Mr. Norwood was hung over from

drinking the night before but testified that he did not drink any
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alcohol that morning.
drunk that morning.

R. 220. He also claimed that he was not

R. 234.

Mr. Norwood did acknowledge that he did not feel very well,
had a headache, was sick to his stomach, and had dry heaves.
R. 223, 229. Although he felt badly and claimed to be in search of
food, he walked right past the Broadway Deli, which had food.
R. 223.
As Mr. Norwood cut through an alley, he "got jumped" and
was stabbed.

R. 205.

He was "jumped" just as he was approaching a

guardrail which he intended to go over.
when he got "jumped."

R. 222. He was surprised

R. 242.

The first thing Mr. Norwood saw or felt was a fist which he
felt hitting his head.
person who stabbed him.

R. 240. The person who hit him was the same
R. 205. Although that person's face was

about eight inches from Mr. Norwood's face, Mr. Norwood could not
see the person who hit him in the head.

R. 240.

Mr. Norwood also saw the knife blade and the hand that was
holding the knife.

R. 245.

right hand that he saw.

There was nothing unusual about the

R. 245. Appellant has tattoos on his right

hand which include a black cross which is two inches by one inch and
a half-inch cross between his thumb and forefinger.

R. 120.

The assailant got Mr. Norwood "broadside" and stabbed him.
R. 205.

The perpetrator took eight dollars that Mr. Norwood had

gotten from donating plasma or from his "partner."

R. 205.

Mr. Norwood testified that at the time of the stabbing, he said
"Chico, you are stabbing me."

R. 205.
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Mr. Norwood believed that his assailant was "Chico/1 a man
he had seen briefly sometime during the previous couple days.
R. 211.

On the night he met "Chico," Mr. Norwood and his "partner"

were camping in a vacant lot where a number of homeless people slept
at night.

R. 211-2, 200-01. The pair had been drinking vodka, and

Mr. Norwood was tired.

R. 202-03, 212, 216.

It was dark, and the

only light in the field came from a nearby fire.

R. 200-01, 213.

Mr. Norwood crawled into his sleeping bag, preparing to go
to sleep, when a woman named Michelle approached with a man named
"Chico."

R. 202-3, 211-12. The woman introduced "Chico," and

Mr. Norwood claimed to have looked closely at "Chico" because he did
not know "Chico" and wanted to make sure there was no trouble.
R. 203, 214.

"Chico" and Mr. Norwood did not shake hands or talk.

R. 203.
Mr. Norwood saw "Chico" for only a few seconds.
He was tired, so he lay down and fell asleep right away.

R. 217.
R. 216-17.

Mr. Norwood cannot write and had trouble drawing a map or
pointing out accurately where things were located in the area where
the incident occurred.

R. 224-27.

Because of his drinking, he also

has a hard time keeping track of money and did not know where five
of the eight dollars he had received from giving plasma had gone.
R. 232.
Detective Mendez interviewed Mr. Norwood for the first time
several days after the incident.

R. 207, 249.

Mr. Norwood

described his assailant as being a little shorter than Mr. Norwood,
who is 5'10" tall.

R. 207, 235, 251. Mr. Norwood gave a weight of
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160 to 170 pounds.

R. 251. Mr. Norwood said that the assailant had

a heavy Mexican accent.

R. 254.

Dennis Couch testified that Mr. Ramirez does not have a
strong Mexican accent.

R. 247-47a.

Appellant is 5'2".

R. 244.

Detective Howell first interviewed Mr. Norwood on
December 10, 1990 as the pair drove to places where transients
congregate, looking for the assailant.

R. 134. At that time,

Mr. Norwood described the assailant as 5'5" tall; this contrasted
with Mr. Norwood's initial statements that the robber was about
5'9".

R. 147-8. Mr. Norwood described the weight as 130 to 140

pounds.

R. 148.
The robber was a dark-haired Hispanic with a mustache;

Mr. Norwood is not Hispanic.

R. 148. Mr. Norwood did not describe

any marks, tattoos or scars.

R. 149.

hairline or facial features.

R. 146. Mr. Norwood thought the

robber was thirty years old.

R. 149. Mr. Ramirez is forty-one

years old.

He also did not describe

R. 06.

On December 20, 1990, police arrested Mr. Ramirez in this
case.

The probable cause statement in the Information filed on

December 21, 1990 stated that "Leslie Norwood has identified the
defendant as the individual who stabbed him . . . ."
added)

(emphasis

R. 7.
Mr. Norwood had not selected Mr. Ramirez from a photo

spread, lineup, showup, or any other identification proceeding at
the time the Information was filed; nor had officers held any such
proceedings in which Mr. Ramirez or his picture were involved.
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R. 138. This statement was apparently included in the Information
because Mr. Norwood believed that "Chico" was his assailant and
officers decided that Mr. Ramirez was "Chico".

R. 155-6.

Officer Howell did eventually show Mr. Norwood a photo
spread which did not contain Appellant's picture.

R. 137, 151.

Although Mr. Norwood had met Detective Howell on several occasions
and claimed that he knew who Detective Howell was, Mr. Norwood could
not remember who had shown him the photo spread or whether such
person was male or female.

R. 235-6.

Other than being Hispanic males, the men in the photo
spread did not appear similar to Appellant.
Defendant's Exhibit 3.
Id.

See State's Exhibit 1,

None of the men had receding hairlines.

One of the men was over six feet tall, and apparently only one

of the men pictured was less than 5'5".

R. 153.

Mr. Norwood indicated that the photograph in the lower
right-hand corner of the photo spread looked like his assailant but
did not make a positive identification.

R. 208, 237. The

individual in the lower right-hand corner had a full head of black
curly hair; Appellant had short, straight hair with a receding
hairline.

State's Exhibit 3; Defendant's Exhibit 1.

Several days

after the incident, Detective Howell believed that one of the
individuals in this photo spread was "Chico."

R. 151, 153.

On January 30, 1991, Detective Howell transported
Mr. Ramirez to the courtroom where a preliminary hearing was being
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held on another charge against Mr. Ramirez.1
subpoenaed Mr. Norwood for this hearing.

The State had

R. 154.

Detective Howell had told Mr. Norwood that they had gotten
the man who had stabbed him.

R. 237. Although Mr. Norwood did not

believe that Detective Howell was present, Detective Howell
testified that Mr. Norwood was with him and told him something of
import.

R. 141-2, 144, 145, 209. Mr. Norwood testified that he did

tell Detective Howell later, at a lineup, that he had seen his
assailant while at the preliminary hearing.

R. 210.

Although

Mr. Norwood had repeated interactions with Officer Howell and knew
who he was, Mr. Norwood claimed that he did not talk to
Detective Howell on the day of the preliminary hearing.

R. 236-7,

239.
Mr. Ramirez was the only man in jail clothing and shackles
at the hearing where Mr. Norwood made his initial "identification."
R. 238-9.

After the preliminary hearing, two lineups were held.

R. 142. The first was a "blind" lineup which did not include
Mr. Ramirez.

R. 143.

Detective Howell told Mr. Norwood that the

assailant may or may not be present.
Mr. Ramirez from the second lineup.

Mr. Norwood selected
R. 143.

Dr. Bryan Finkle gave expert testimony regarding the effect
of a .364 blood alcohol level on an individual's cognitive
abilities.

R. 184. He testified that such blood alcohol level is

extremely high and that an individual would have to drink excessive

1. Mr. Ramirez was subsequently acquitted by a jury on this other
charge.
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in liinjii,,, fiIt i if alcohol on a routine basis for a number of years In order
to be able to tolerate that amount u1 .*!< nhcl

mrl r^najn standing.

Finkle pointed out that anyone with such a high level
system would suffer severe impairment of his
mental abilities regardless or whether he
disabilities

K,

cal

1Hh

i nl'11 It;--J if iie-ij further that memory is severely
impaired by alcohol and that people who drink excess
memory blackouts
the^r max^mum

He also testified that people reach

|;>

nywhere from 4 5 to 90 minutes

after their last drink.

Had Mr. Norwood stopped ilir uniiing

ninety minutes or longer before the incident, his blood alcohol
level would have there! oi:e hirn c>v<sn 11 i q 11 * -1 • than the recorded .364.
R 190.
Dr. David Dodd gave expert testimony on memory processes.
He testified that when one i". mullet r» K 1 r < • tuc^, llil'e threatening
stress, observations are likely to be distorted.

R 2; 2

Observations made after significant amounts of alcohol are consumed
are also distorted.

He Inubl i?i.l thi.it, Mi. I

would

able to adequately observe and process the face of "Chico" under the
circumstances ai uhe camp a night or two before the stabbing.
R •• 2 7 5

Dodd also testified that the description given closer
in, t iiiiif!"

ii'iii1 idpinit w.ns i i k e t y t o b e more a c c u r a t e t h a n t h e

description given later,

l< .! 7 7

.Suggestibility,

viuuh <n. L.IT i IIJ a

single suspect in the courtroom in jail clothing, can cause an
individual to select that person.

R. 278-9.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
All five of the factors set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), for determining whether admission of an
eyewitness identification procedure violates the Utah constitution
weigh against admission.
Not only did the witness lack the capacity to observe the
perpetrator because of his extremely high blood alcohol level of
.364, he also acknowledged that he did not in fact see the person.
This alone should preclude admission of the identification.
In addition, however, Mr. Norwood had little opportunity to
observe the assailant.

Mr. Norwood's attention was focused on the

hand and weapon rather than the face of the person.

Mr. Norwood did

not describe tattoos on the hand; Appellant has tattoos.
Mr. Norwood's description changed significantly over time as he had
successive contact with the investigating officers; his initial
description did not fit Appellant.
Finally, the showup identification after the officer told
Mr. Norwood that they had arrested the perpetrator was unduly
suggestive.
The admission of the identification also violated due
process under the federal constitution.

The procedure was unduly

suggestive, and the five Biaaers factors weigh against admission.
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ARGUMENT
POINT. ADMISSION OF THE EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION VIOLATED DUE PROCESS UNDER THE
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
Tin1 fd i I ilul ml y i*if eyewitness identification is well
documented in various studies and utah case law,

See state v. Long,

721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986); State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774,
Eyewitness Testimony; Civil
and Criminal. -

In Long,

d M 4HH, the supreme

Court stated:
The literature is replete with empirical studies
documenting the unreliability of eyewitness
identification. (citations omitted). There is
no significant division of opinion on the issue.
The studies all lead inexorably to the conclusion
that human perception is inexact and that human
memory is both limited and fallible.
(emphasis added).
Despite the acknowledged unreliability of eyewitness
identification, jurors give tremendous Wfiqlit In {.-null li-^l imony
criminal trials.
in Ij.uruj

Loftus and Doyle at 24 5; Long. 721 P.2d at 490.
I lnj four I recognized that eyewitness

identification involves three memory processes
information, the retention «
information.

information, and the retrieval of such

L.ori'1, • „l"" 1 P.2a at 490; see also

The Court

also recognized that the memory process
each stage.
Norwood's ability to acquire
information,,

to the identity of the assailant, his ability ti„

retain such information, and his ability to retrieve such

information were subject to such great distortion that admission of
his eyewitness identification of Appellant as the robber violated
due process under both the state and federal constitutions.

A, THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE
VIOLATED ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law."
In State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah
Supreme Court adopted an analysis for eyewitness identification
procedures under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution which
differs from the federal analysis as set forth in Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).

The Court based its divergence on

scientific studies which demonstrate that eyewitness identification
is often unreliable and which refute some of factors relied on in
Biggers.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779-780; see also State v. Long, 721

P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).
The Court determined that:
The analytical model to be followed under
article I, section 7 of the Utah constitution is
structured around the criteria discussed in
Long. The ultimate question to be determined is
whether, under the totality of circumstances, the
identification was reliable.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781.
The State has the burden of establishing that the evidence
is constitutionally admissible.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778. The
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I: le\

i-i1.1

lii. I «.i s i

determining whether an identification procedure

violates the Utah constitution are:
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree
of attention to the actor at the time of the
event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the
event, including his or her physical and mental
acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification
was made spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being
observed and the likelihood that the witness
would perceive, remember and relate it correct
i ourt pointed out that "[a] finer analysis of these
factors

icluded in Long.

Long. 721 *-

analysis should be

assistance to the bench and bar in applying these factors when EI
challenge I;:o I, I, m? i orih I

arises. "

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783
An issessment of the Ramirez/Long factors as they apply to
the facts in the present case demons! i «itj * tli.t1 t hi:i * t i. -i I judge's
ruling that Mr. Norwood's identification was admissible violates due
pi:< J ; iess; u n d e r A r i i c h ' j „, S e c t i o n

' of

the lit «:i11 c o n s t i t u t i o n .

( I,) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor
during the event.

This factor relates t

the acquisition of

icludes a consideration of
a) the length ol tune I:, hi- ni i tnesset
* *i
the* actor;
b) the distance between the witness and
actor;
c) the extent to which the actor's features
were visible and undisguised;
d) the light or lack of 1 i ght at the place
ai id time of observation;
e) the presence [or] absence of distracting
noises or activity during the observation;

f) any other circumstances affecting the
witness' opportunity to observe the person
committing the crime.
Long, 721 P.2d at 494 n.8.
An analysis of Mr. Norwood's opportunity to view the actor
demonstrates that the selection of Appellant as the assailant is
unreliable.

Mr. Norwood testified that he was approaching a

guardrail which he intended to climb over when he "got jumped" and
stabbed.

R. 205, 222. The first thing he saw or felt was a fist

hitting his head.

R. 240. He was surprised.

R. 242.

Mr. Norwood acknowledged that during the course of these
events, he did not see the person who hit him.

R. 240.2

Mr. Norwood's testimony establishes that he did not have the
opportunity to observe the actor.

The length of contact was short,

the actor was not visible, and the surprise attack left Mr. Norwood
only with the opportunity to see a hand and hear a voice.
Mr. Norwood's opportunity to view the actor was not as
strong as the opportunity of the witness in State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d at 782.

In Ramirez, the witness was aware of and stared at the

gunman; he described in detail the gunman's eyes.

By contrast,

Norwood never saw the face of his assailant.
(2)

The witness's degree of attention to the actor at the

time of the event.

This factor as it applies to the present case

also demonstrates the unreliability of this identification.

2. Mr. Norwood did see a right hand holding a knife but apparently
did not see the tattoos that Mr. Ramirez has on his right hand.
R. 244-5, 249.

- 14 -

Although M r . Norwood w a s aware of being jumped, *-- h a d n o
a w a r e n e s s immediately prion
occur.

i HH-«I pto I J M I

>I I T LHIH

w a s about •

A s p r e v i o u s l y outlined, h e did n o t s e e t h e perse

riiii" i" MI,; M?i"i

in i m

11

\\»»in •

S c i e n t i f i c s t u d i e s ri I ibi it'in uu- t t'lit'e the existence of a
phenomenon which has been labeled as "weapon focus
Doylfe

ijoftus

Studies have shown that where a weapon is

involved, the individual is likely I'u. In • I,I . i, 1 hij w e a p o n , resulting
1 f

attention being paid other f a c t o r s , including t h e face o

perpe11; a f, ^ ,

Addendum C.

M r . N o r w o o d ' s testimony suggest
"weapon f o c u s " during t h i s incident
blade of thr ' u i f i:i l-u1

^rienced

H e w a s able •

describe t h e

I.. f ,...1 see h i s assailant # s face,

K. 2 4 0,

245.
The application of this second factor to the instant case
is also stronger 1 ' ,i? -,1, Ranu^e>j , ,i n Ramirez. the witness was
"fully aware that a robbery was taking place" and h &iareo ^
'^jnnijn, trying to qet r\ good description,,f
783.

By contrast
(3)

MI

Ramirez. 817 P.2d at

nni., urn iv--• • -,:".i)» |»r i serJ and stared at the knife.

The witness's capacity to observe the event, including

his or her physical or mental acuity.

The capacity ' • observe

(i«ji ,un<ii im »i n/ations « • prejudices,

includes stress anc

, Jit

fatigue, and drugs

alcohol consumed by the witness.

i

-* -

unreliability

'" i»^

factor demonstrates t h e overwhelming
tit i

is ("use,,

-

lb -

Mr. Norwood had consumed an excessive amount of alcohol.
His blood alcohol level shortly after the event was .364. Unless he
consumed alcohol within 45 to 90 minutes of being tested, his blood
alcohol level would actually have been higher than .364 at the time
of the event.

R. 190.

A blood alcohol level of .364 is more than four times the
legal limit of .08 for driving an automobile.

Dr. Finkle testified

that an individual would have to drink large amounts of alcohol over
a long period of time in order to be able to reach a blood alcohol
level that high at a given time and still be conscious.

R. 185.

Dr. Finkle also testified that regardless of one's physical
manifestations of the effect of the alcohol, an individual's
cognitive abilities and ability to adequately assess and acquire
information would be strongly affected by that amount of alcohol.
R. 185.
The emergency room doctor who treated Mr. Norwood testified
that he was in a stupor.

R. 173-4.

Mr. Norwood testified that he was "hung over" at the time
of the incident.

R. 220. He did not feel well, had a headache, was

sick to his stomach, and had dry heaves.

R. 223, 229.

Mr. Norwood's blood alcohol level and physical condition
demonstrate that it is highly unlikely that he was able to
accurately perceive the assailant.
In addition, the extreme stress and surprise associated
with a sudden attack and knifing may well preclude an individual
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from accurately acquiring information as to the identification of
the perpetrator.
Dr. Dodd testified that when an individual is placed in an
extremely stressful, life threatening situation, memory of the event
and persons involved is likely to be distorted.

R. 272.

This

testimony comports with scientific research which demonstrates that
victims of extreme violence or traumatic events are likely to be
unable to accurately perceive the events and also likely to have a
distorted memory of what occurred.

Loftus and Doyle, § 2.12 at 43-6.

The overwhelming impact of this factor on Mr. Norwood's
ability to perceive the event contrasts markedly with the
application of this factor in Ramirez.

Although the witness

experienced a "heightened degree of stress" in Ramirez, "[a]side
from the late hour and the injury from the pipe blow, there is
nothing in the record to indicate Wilson was impaired by fatigue,
injury, drugs, or alcohol."

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783.

By contrast,

Mr. Norwood was ill from having consumed too much alcohol and was
significantly impaired by alcohol.
(4)

Whether the witness'& identification was made

spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was
the product of suggestion.

This factor relates to the

suggestibility of the identification procedure and includes:
a) the length of time that passed between
the witness' original observation and his [her]
identification of the defendant;
b) the witness' [mental] capacity and state
of mind at the time of the identification;
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c) the witness' exposure to opinions,
descriptions or identifications given by other
witnesses, to photographs or newspaper accounts,
or to any other information or influence that may
have affected the independence of his [her]
identification;
d) any instances when the witness, or any
eyewitness to the crime, gave a description of
the actor that is inconsistent with the
defendant's appearance;
f) the circumstances under which the
defendant was presented to the witness for
identification.
Long. 721 P.2d at 494-5 n.8.

This last consideration should include

a recognition that "an identification made by picking the defendant
from a group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than
an identification made from the defendant being presented alone to
the witness."

Id.

In the present case, an analysis of this fourth factor also
demonstrates the unreliability of this identification.

Mr. Norwood

selected Appellant at the end of January, almost two months after
the incident occurred.

Although Mr. Norwood's mental capacity and

state of mind at the time of the selection are not clear, the record
demonstrates that Mr. Norwood is a chronic alcoholic; under such
circumstances, alcohol use on the day of preliminary hearing is
likely.
Prior to the identification, Detective Howell told
Mr. Norwood that they had arrested the person who attacked him, and
Mr. Norwood apparently went to the preliminary hearing expecting to
see that person.

R. 237.

Mr. Norwood's initial description of the assailant, given
closer in time to the event and more likely to be accurate, is
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inconsistent with Mr. Ramirez' appearance.

Mr. Ramirez is 5'2".

R. 244. This height is extremely short for a man and is apt to be
one of the first things one would notice.

Nevertheless, Mr. Norwood

described a much larger assailant who was 5'9" or so.
Mr. Norwood gave only a general description of his
assailant; Mr. Norwood did not give a specific description of facial
features or hairline.

R. 146.

Finally, the circumstances under which the identification
was made were highly suggestive.

Only one possible person,

Mr. Ramirez in jail clothes, was available for Mr. Norwood's
inspection.

R. 238-9.

Detective Howell had already told

Mr. Norwood they had the robber.

R. 237. Under such circumstances,

pointing to Mr. Ramirez as the robber was highly unreliable.3
This factor is also stronger in establishing unreliability
in the instant case than in Ramirez.

In Ramirez. the identification

was made shortly after the event and there was no indication of
witness impairment at the time of the identification.
It should also be noted that in the probable cause
statement in the Information, the State had indicated that

3. It should be noted that at the time of the preliminary hearing,
Mr. Ramirez was represented by court appointed counsel on this
case. R. 03. Any formal eyewitness identification procedure in
which Mr. Ramirez appeared, such as a lineup or showup proceeding,
would have required notice to and presence of counsel. Moore v.
Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 98 S.Ct. 458, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149
(1967). This identification proceeding violated Mr. Ramirez' sixth
amendment right to counsel and requires suppression of the
identification testimony. See Comm. v. Donovan. 467 N.E.2d 198
(Mass. 1984).
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Mr. Norwood had identified Mr. Ramirez.

R. 07.

Defense counsel

appeared at the preliminary hearing on the other charge unaware that
Mr. Norwood would be present and unaware that he had not identified
Mr. Ramirez.

The procedure utilized by the State in obtaining an

identification violated Mr. Ramirez' right to counsel and due
process.
(5)

The nature of the event being perceived and the

likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it
correctly.

This final factor also demonstrates the unreliability of

this identification.
As previously outlined, the extreme stress and weapon focus
made it unlikely that Mr. Norwood would accurately perceive the
event.
Detective Howell drove Mr. Norwood around looking for the
assailant.

At that time, Mr. Norwood's description of the assailant

changed from the description initially given to Detective Mendez.
R. 147-8.

It is reasonable to assume that this process impacted on

Mr. Norwood's memory.
Mr. Norwood and Appellant are of a different race.
Mr. Norwood believed that his assailant was a male Hispanic.
R. 148. He focused on the heavy Mexican accent of the robber.
R. 254. Appellant does not have a heavy accent.

R. 247-47a.

This

racial disparity is troubling and demonstrates the unreliability of
the identification.
This final factor is similar to that in Ramirez.

In

Ramirez. officers used a showup identification procedure with only
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one suspect; officers indicated that they had apprehended someone
who matched the description of one of the robbers.

In the present

case, the showup was at least as suggestive since only one
individual was involved, he was dressed in jail clothing and seated
at defense table, and the witness had been told that officers had
arrested his assailant.
In Ramirez, the Court found the "blatant suggestiveness of
the showup . . . troublesome."

Id. at 784. The Court pointed out

that the case was "extremely close" and expressed concerns about the
differences in racial characteristics between the witness and the
defendant.

However, because the identification "was based

principally on the eyes, physical size, and clothing," the Court
ultimately upheld the trial court's ruling that the identification
was admissible.
No such saving factors occur in this case.

The witness did

not observe the actor, and even if Mr. Norwood had seen the face of
the assailant, Mr. Norwood's physical condition precluded him from
making an accurate assessment.

This lack of opportunity or ability

to observe, coupled with the other factors set forth above,
including the racial differences and "blatant suggestiveness" of the
procedure, require that the identification be suppressed.
Mr. Norwood grounded his determination that "Chico" was the
assailant on a single meeting a night or two before the incident.
Mr. Norwood's ability to recognize "Chico" after that short previous
contact is also questionable.
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Mr. Norwood had little opportunity to view "Chico" on that
previous night and had an impaired capacity to observe.
202-03, 2116.

R. 211-2,

Mr. Norwood was very tired when Chico approached his

camp and was already in his sleeping bag.

R. 203, 212, 216.

He was

so tired that he immediately fell asleep after "Chico11 approached
his camp.

R. 216-17.

Mr. Norwood#s blood alcohol level on the night "Chico" came
to the camp is unknown; however, Mr. Norwood acknowledged that he
had been drinking vodka that night.

R. 202-3, 212, 216.

He viewed

"Chico" for only a few seconds and did not shake hands or talk with
him.

R. 203, 217.
It was dark when "Chico" went to the camp.

provided the only illumination of "Chico's" face.

A campfire

R. 200-01, 213.

Although Mr. Norwood claimed to have looked closely at
Chico to make sure there was no trouble, there appears to have been
nothing unusual about this event, and nothing that made it stand out
in any way from other brief encounters Mr. Norwood had with people
at the camp.

In fact, Mr. Norwood's description of the short

duration of the contact suggests that his contact with Chico was
innocuous and unlikely to stand out in his memory.
The circumstances under which Mr. Norwood "met" "Chico"
suggest that he would be unable to process that face and later
identify the person who was with Michelle.

Those circumstances,

coupled with the overwhelming unreliability of any identification of
the perpetrator, establish that admission of Mr. Norwood's
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eyewitness identification testimony violated due process under
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution.

B. THE ADMISSION OF THE EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION VIOLATED THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
The fourteenth amendment due process clause precludes the
admission of identification testimony which is obtained through
suggestive and unreliable means.

An analysis of the admissibility

of eyewitness identification testimony involves a two-prong approach
under the federal constitution.

Adams. 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 73.

First, the court must determine whether the
identification procedure was unnecessarily
suggestive so as to give rise to the possibility
of irreparable misidentification. Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-200, 93 S.Ct. 375,
381-82 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 383-84, 88 S.Ct. 967, 970-71 (1968);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct.
1967, 1972 (1967).
Second, the court must determine "whether
under the totality of the circumstances, the
identification was reliable." Biggers, 409 U.S.
at 199;, 93 S.Ct. at 382; see also Mason v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253
(1977) .
Although aspects of the Biggers test have been criticized
(see Long, 721 P.2d at 491-2; Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779-81), those
factors continue to be considered in determining the admissibility
of an eyewitness identification under the federal constitution.4
The Biggers factors are:

4. The better approach under a federal analysis would be to
disregard the criticized factors, especially "the level of
certainty," and analyze the identification procedure under the
remaining factors. See Appellants brief in State v. Livio Ramirez.
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 880425.
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1. The opportunity of the witness to view
the criminal at the time of the crime;
2. The witness's degree of attention;
3. The accuracy of the witness's prior
description of the criminal;
4. The level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the confrontation; and
5. The length of time between the crime and
the confrontation.
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200.
In the present case, as set forth supra at 18-19, the
identification procedure was unduly suggestive since Mr. Norwood was
informed that officers had arrested the robber and then was shown a
single individual in jail clothing.

The first prong under Biggers

weighs against admitting the identification testimony.
An analysis of the five Biggers factors also weighs against
admissibility.

As set forth supra at 14, Mr. Norwood did not have

an opportunity to view his assailant and did not see the person who
attacked him.

Nor was he paying much attention to the face of the

perpetrator, focusing instead on the weapon.

See discussion supra

at 15. He was extremely intoxicated and very ill, thereby impairing
his ability to process information as to the identity of his
assailant.

See discussion supra at 15-17.

The first two factors of

the Biggers test weigh against admitting the identification
testimony.
Mr. Norwood's description of the robber changed over time.
His initial description did not fit Appellant; Mr. Norwood described
a significantly larger individual.

See discussion supra at 19-20.

The third Biggers factor weighs against admitting the evidence.

- 24 -

The fourth factor, level of certainty, has been much
criticized.

See Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781; Long. 721 P.2d at 490.

Given the abundance of scientific studies indicating that an
individual's level of certainty in making an identification has no
bearing on the accuracy of an identification, this Court should
disregard this factor in making the Biaaers analysis.

The rationale

for disregarding this factor is discussed in detail in Appellant's
opening brief in State v. Livio Ramirez. Utah Supreme Court Case No.
880425.
However, even if this factor is considered, the
circumstances of this case indicate that this fourth factor is
neutral.

Although Mr. Norwood seemed fairly certain that Chico

robbed him, his level of certainty that Appellant is Chico is
unclear; perhaps because this factor has been so criticized, no one
asked Mr. Norwood his level of certainty.
The fifth factor, the length of time between the crime and
the confrontation, weighs in favor of suppression.

Almost two

months passed between the incident and the preliminary hearing on
the other case.

R. 6, 154. This is a significant amount of time

which would allow distortion in both the retention and retrieval
phases of Mr. Norwood's memory.
The Biaaers factors coupled with the "corruptive effect" of
the identification procedure establish that admission of the
eyewitness identification in this case violates federal due process.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Nicholas Ramirez respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the trial judge's order denying his motion
to suppress eyewitness identification and reverse his conviction and
remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

SUBMITTED this ^LOtL day of July, 1992.

<M^-CCJMC
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
2 ^

A. BOWMAN
Attorney for DeCendant/AppeJ-lant

VERNICE/S. AH CHING
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED this
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
^"^

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

Plaintiff
v.
NICHOLAS G. RAMIREZ,
Defendant.

Case No.

<f//<JC?GSSQL

JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON

COMES NOW Defendant, NICHOLAS G. RAMIREZ, by and through
counsel, ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN and VERNICE S. AH CHING, to move this
Court to suppress his identification on the grounds that the initial
identification procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification and that the initial identification
tainted subsequent identifications.
Any introduction of eyewitness identification at trial
would violate Nicholas Ramirez's right to due process of law under
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution because the

identification was unreliable.

State v. Ramirez, 157 Utah Adv.

Rep. 10.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^>I

day of May, 1991.

^x^^HTlZABETH A./k0ftMAN
Attorney for Defendant

VERNICE S/ AH CHING
Attorney for Defendant

/"

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the aboveentitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on the
of

f^l

7

( A I?;

, 1991, a t t h e hour of

^? 'tf<0 A.m. b e f o r e t h e

Honoraible Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District Court Judge.
urselves accordingly.
DATED this ^ i

day of May, 1991.

day

Please

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this

day of May, 1991.

DELIVERED BY
J UN * 11991

WJ055
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VERNICE S. AH CHING (#5243)
Attorneys for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION

Plaintiff
v.
NICHOLAS G. RAMIREZ,
Defendant.

Case No. 911900177
JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON

Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides, "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."

Utah Const. Art. I, § 7.

The burden of

demonstrating the admissibility of the proffered evidence is on the
prosecution.

The State must lay the foundation upon which the trial

court can make any necessary preliminary factual findings and reach
necessary legal conclusions.

State v. Ramirez. 157 Utah Adv. Rep.

10, 12 (Utah 1991).
The court must then determine whether the evidence is
constitutionally admissible.

00056

State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439 at 463

(Utah 1988).
the jury.

If the evidence is admissible, it may be presented to

The court should not sidestep its responsibility by

leaving the matter to the "whim of a jury."

Ramirez at 13. Utah's

Supreme Court is particularly concerned about careful scrutiny of
the evidence on eyewitness identification prior to allowing the jury
to hear the matter "because of the probability that such evidence
even though thoroughly discredited has a powerful effect on the
jury."

Ramirez at 13 citing State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah

1986).
The federal approach requires a determination by the court,
considering "all the circumstances" of whether the identification is
sufficiently reliable such that admission of the evidence will not
deny the defendant due process.

Five factors cited in Neil v.

Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 at 199, credited with being important are:
the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the witness'
degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness'
prior description of the criminal, the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time between the
crime and the confrontation.
Id.
In State v. Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court departed from
the federal analysis in part because of finding little or no
scientific support for the factors.
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Under the Utah Constitution, the test is whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable.
Those factors were listed in State v. Long:
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree
of attention to the actor at the time of the
event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the
event, including his or her physical and mental
acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification
was made spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being
observed and the likelihood that the witness
would perceive, remember and relate it
correctly. This last area includes such factors
as whether the event was an ordinary one in the
mind of the observer during the time it was
observed, and whether the race of the actor was
the same as the observer's.
Long, 721 P.2d at 493.
The third factor is whether the witness had the capacity to
observe the actor during the event and includes the issue of
impairment.

In the instant case, Dr. Cameron Schaeffer will testify

that Leslie Norwood, the alleged victim, had a blood alcohol content
of .364 immediately following the stabbing.

Mr. Norwood testified

at the preliminary hearing that he had last consumed alcohol the
night before, so his blood alcohol level would have been higher at
the time of the incident.

An alcohol level four and one-half times

higher than the presumptive value for impairment (.08) undoubtedly
would affect Mr. Norwood's perception.

00058
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He was first interviewed

December 6, 1990, five days after the event.

Mr. Norwood described

the assailant as 5'8" to 5'9", 170 to 180 pounds, with a strong
hispanic accent who had the name of Chico.

He gave no description

of facial hair, tatoos, or clothing worn.
In a photo spread consisting of four hispanic males
believed to be in the area at the time of the stabbing, Mr. Norwood
tentatively identified Juan Blanco, who was 5'5" and 155 pounds and
who had a thin mustache and a full head of hair.

Officer Howell's

perception of Norwood's response to the photo spread was "Juan
Blanco is probably Chico.w

Mr. Norwood was never shown a photo

spread which included Mr. Ramirez.
On January 30, 1991, Leslie Norwood was brought to court.
Mr. Ramirez was seated at defense counsel's table on another
unrelated case.

Mr. Ramirez was the only person in custody and in

jail clothing in the room at the time and was then identified by
Mr. Norwood for the first time, two months after the crime.
Two lawyers observed the stabbing—Victor Schwartz and
Keith Pope.

Both lawyers thought the assailant was close in height

to the victim (5'10lf) or perhaps a little shorter (5'8M to 5'9") .
Mr. Pope could not describe any of the assailants as hispanic.
Mr. Ramirez, according to Officer Howell, is 5'2".

Therefore, all

the witnesses, including Leslie Norwood, describe someone other than
Mr. Ramirez.
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Finally, the court must address suggestibility, "whether
the witness' identification was . . . the product of suggestion."
Ramirez at 16 citing Long, 721 P.2d at 493.

The blatant

suggestiveness of the in-court showup denied Mr. Nicholas Ramirez
his due process rights.

Since the showup, Mr. Norwood has

consistently pointed to Mr. Ramirez as the assailant.

Before the

showup, he neither described someone fitting Mr. Ramirez's
description nor did he identify him from any photos.
Mr. Ramirez asks this Court to suppress his identification
under both the federal and state constitutions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *S>1

day of May, 1991.

/''&£iZAB£TH A/^6WMAN
Attorney for Defendant

r

VERNjfcj^£. AH CHING
Attorney for Defendant
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Moeo

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g t o t h e County
A t t o r n e y ' s O f f i c e , 231 East 400 South, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
this

day of May, 1991.

DELIVERED BY

JU:J * .1 1991

m$t
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ADDENDUM B

Di.r-6",'^
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
•ZBIS
7

THE STATE OF UTAH,

50 4# '£•

in;

JUDGMEJtX.lSENTENCE';} TRICT
(COMMITMEHTXJO
"J'ITY

Plaintiff,

SALT LAKE COUNTY JATfcr-^.

vs.

Case No.
Count No.

NICHOLAS GARCIA RAMIREZ

9 1 1 9 0 0 5 8 2

Honorable HOMER K. WILKINSON
Clerk
AMY BAST IAN
Reporter ED MIDGLEY
Bailiff
HARRY J . WILENSKI

Defendant.

Date

FEBRUARY

1 4 , 199?

E The motion nf S T A T E
_ to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is EI granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty;©plea
of no contest; of the offense of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
a class
A misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and represented by
B. BOWMAN & V . AHHHTNGflnH the State being represented by
T . VTTYTT
, js
now adjudged guilty of the above offense,
89
IS
D
D

is now sentenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail,
of _ 1 2 _ _ months;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
;
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $

to

D such sentence is to run concurrently with
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, • Defense, D Court, Count(s)

are hereby dismissed.

GO DEFENDANT IS GRANTED HRFDTT FOR TTMF SFRVED (U
K) THE GOTTRT ORDERS THAT THE DEFENDANT BE RFT.FASFD

•

mos , )

FROM TAIL FORTHWITH,
Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and
Parole for the period of
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be confined and
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
Commitment shall issue
DATED this

1 * day of

FEBRUARY

19_92

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
/

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

00107

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

1 ^ ' : " ' r ,r'-AT r H I : ' «S A TRUE COPY CF AN
ORlGiNAt. DOCUMENT ON ?i|_'- !N THP THian
OSSTniCT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY.
CTAlS OF
™
TY. STATE
.
TJTATI
Page -k
DATE

•J-s/ -7a

DEPUTY COURT CLERK
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ADDENDUM C

§2.15

Factors Determining Perception

people concentrate more on just a few features from their environment,
and they consequently pay less attention to others. This selectivity of
attention can be seen when people experience crimes involving weapons.
§2.15

Weapon focus

The term weapon focus refers to the concentration of a crime witness'
attention on a weapon—the barrel of a gun or the blade of a knife—and
the resultant reduction in ability to remember other details of the crime.
Evidence of the existence of weapon focus stems primarily from two
sources. In the traditional perception literature, there are experiments in
which eye movements have been monitored while people observe complex scenes. This work shows that people fixate faster, more often, and
for longer durations on unusual or highly informative objects.38 It is generally agreed by eye movement researchers that eyefixationdata provide
a valid measure of where in a scene and to what an individual is
attending.
A second source of evidence for weapon focus stems from studies in
which subject-witnesses watch simulated crimes. In one study, unsuspecting subjects sat outside an experimental laboratory waiting to participate in an experiment.39 A receptionist was there briefly and then left on
some pretext. While waiting, subjects in the "no weapon" condition
overheard an innocuous conversation about an equipment failure, saw a
target individual enter the room holding a grease pen, watched him utter
a single line and leave. In the "weapon" condition, subjects overheard a
hostile conversation along with crashing objects, saw a target individual
enter the room holding a bloodied letter opener, watched him utter a
single line and leave. In both conditions, the target individual was
viewed for four seconds. Subjects were later tested on their memory for
the event. Nearly every subject in the weapon phase described some sort
of weapon, whereas very few of the subjects in the no-weapon phase described the comparable item. Moreover, the presence of the weapon was
associated with a reduced ability to identify the target individual from a
set of fifty photographs that were shown later.
M

Loftus & Mackworth, Cognitive Determinants of Fixation Location During Picture

Viewing

4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUMAN PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE

565 (1978).
39

C. Johnson & B. Scott, Eyewitness Testimony and Suspect Identification as a Function
of Arousal, Sex of Witness, and Scheduling of Interrogation (Paper presented at the
American Psychologial Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C. 1976).

51

§2.15

Chapter 2

This study left much to be desired as a test of the effects of the weapon
because the two conditions differed in so many ways. In one condition,
the target's hands were bloodied while in the other they were full of
grease; in one a hostile conversation preceded the target's entrance into
the reception room; whereas in the other, the conversations were innocuous; the statement uttered by the target in the two conditions was also
diflFerent. Thus, the study provides only suggestive evidence for weapon
focus.
More conclusive evidence comes from a study in which eye movements
are monitored while subjects watch one of two versions of an event that
begins with a customer going through a cafeteria line in a fast-food restaurant. In the weapon version, the customer points a gun at the cashier
and she hands him some money. In the no weapon version, the customer
hands the cashier a check and she returns some money. The events are
identical except for the presence of the weapon in one case and the check
in the other. Eye movements were recorded during the viewing of the
event.
The results of the study were clear. Subjects made more eye fixation
on the weapon than on the check, and the eyefixationswere of a longer
duration than fixations on the check. Moreover, subjects who saw the
weapon had poorer memory for other details of the event. They were
also less able to recognize the "culprit" from a twelve-person array of
photographs.
Why does presence of a weapon lower memory performance? In a
real-life crime situation, weapon focus would presumably be inextricably
interwoven with high arousal caused by the crime itself and intensified by
the presence of a weapon. The high stress itself could be expected to lead
to a narrowing of the range of perceptual focus. In the studies of weapon
focus, we have shown that such narrowing of perceptual focus can occur
in response to a weapon, even when the events are not especially
stressful.40
§ 2.16

Chronic stress

There is another kind of stress that is important to consider, a kind of
general level of anxiety caused by stressful life events. This is diflFerent
from the stress or anxiety produced by the crime or accident itself. Psy«°Loftus, Loftus & Messo, Some Facts About "Weapon Focus." 11
BEHAVIOR 55-62 (1987).
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